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GROUP HOMES IN OKLAHOMA: DOES
JACKSON V. WILLIAMS OFFER NEW HOPE
FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Should property owners seeking to enforce single-family zoning and
covenant restrictions be able to prevent five mentally retarded adult wo-
men from living in a supervised neighborhood home?' Restrictive cove-
nants are valuable property rights that are subject to judicial protection.2
However, there is a growing national movement away from housing the
retarded in large institutions and toward their placement in an eriviron-
ment that emulates "conditions of everyday living which are as close as
possible to the regular circumstances and ways of life of society."3
Neighborhood group homes provide that environment.4
Community opposition, evidenced by exclusionary zoning laws,' has
been a major obstacle to establishing group homes in single-family neigh-
borhoods. In 1985, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Jackson v. Wil-
liams6 was faced with balancing the rights of property owners against the
rights of the mentally retarded to establish a neighborhood group home.
The Jackson court literally interpreted the single-family dwelling re-
strictions imposed by zoning and covenant, and thereby allowed the
group home to be located in a residential neighborhood. Had the court
* The author thanks Professor Donald H. Gjerdingen for reviewing the manuscript and for
his helpful suggestions.
1. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985).
2. See Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 133, 290 N.W.2d 101, 102 (1980).
3. Nine, The Normalization Principle, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES
FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 231 (R. Kugel & A. Shearer eds. 1976). Ninje explains the concept
of normalization, its practical application to all retarded adults, and how it can serve as a guide for
medical, educational, psychological, and political work on behalf of the retarded. Id.
4. See Schonfeld, Not in My Neighborhood "Legal Challenges to the Establishment of Commu-
nity Residences for the Mentally Disabled in New York State, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1985)
(examining laws and lawsuits in New York affecting establishment of community residences for the
mentally disabled); Comment, Is the Group Home "Like a Pig in the Parlor?", 62 Neb. L. Rev. 742
(1983) (examining the rationales underlying decisions concerning group homes for the mentally re-
tarded, and arguments on behalf of the mentally retarded as well as the opposing homeowners).
5. See Comment, Recent Zoning Cases Uphold Establishment of Group Homes for the Mentally
Disabled, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515 (1984) (overview of methods used to exclude group homes
by zoning; constitutional challenges to exclusionary ordinances; and recent state court decisions
favoring group homes).
6. 714 P.2d 1017 (1985).
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been unable to fit the group home within the restrictions, it could have
declared them void as against public policy; 7 voiding the restrictions
would support both the unencumbered use of property' and the rights of
the mentally. retarded to "establish a home."9 Alternatively, the court
could have circumvented the restrictive covenant by invoking the four-
teenth amendment prohibition against discriminatory classifications, as
the Supreme Court did in Shelley v. Kraemer.1" The Jackson court
would have reached the same conclusion using any of these approaches.
II. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
A. Normalization and Group Homes
Because they are mentally retarded," many people require care in
an environment outside their family home. Large public treatment facili-
ties have long been the repository for these individuals, where little was
done to habilitate them. Separation from the community and exclusive
confinement with other mentally retarded persons actually perpetuated
dependence12 and deviant behavior.13 However, during the preceding
twenty years there has been a shift in philosophy resulting in deinstitu-
tionalization: moving the mentally retarded from institutions to small,
community-based, residential facilities.14
The goal of deinstitutionalization is "normalization," which is en-
hanced by using group homes of normal family size, in residential neigh-
7. See id. at 1021.
8. Oklahoma case law supports the unencumbered use of property. See Pirtle v. Wade, 593
P.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); see infra note 78.
9. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.
Ct. 3249, 3266 (1985), calls the right to "establish a home" a fundamental liberty embraced by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
10. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. "As defined by the American Association of Mental Deficiency, mental retardation refers to
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with defects in adap-
tive behavior and manifested during the developmental period." North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 453 (M.D.N.C. 1976). Mildly retarded individuals
constitute 89% of the number of mentally retarded in the United States and their IQ's range from
50-70. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3256 n.9 (1985).
12. Sorgen, Labeling and Classification, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE
LAW 214, 218-19 (M. Kindred ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as CITIZEN AND THE LAW].
13. Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle of Normaliza-
tion, in CrrIZEN AND THE LAW 499.
14. The deinstitutionalization movement gained impetus in 1963 when Congress passed the
Community Mental Health Centers Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, § 200, 77 Stat. 282, 290 (1963). Presi-
dent Kennedy urged the American people to "return to the community the mentally ill and mentally
retarded... to restore and revitalize their lives." President's Message to Congress on Mental Illness
and Mental Retardation, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1466, 1477 (Feb. 5, 1963), quoted in Note,
Zoning for the Mentally Ill." A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARe. J. LEOIs. 853, 853 (1979).
[Vol. 22:201
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borhoods which provide social interaction for mentally retarded
individuals.15 The normalization process was enhanced by federal legis-
lation in 197516 providing the mentally retarded the right to assistance in
maximizing their individual developmental potential in an environment
that is "least restrictive of ... personal liberty."' 7 Additionally, legisla-
tion enacted in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia 18 man-
dates, in various ways and to varying degrees, the location of community
homes for the retarded in residential areas.' 9 Oklahoma is among those
states with no enabling legislation for the mentally retarded. Despite au-
thority favoring community group homes, there is an insufficient number
of community-based homes in most states to accommodate the mentally
retarded.20
Although the national resident population in institutions for the
mentally retarded was reduced thirty percent between 1970 and 1982,21
the majority of Oklahoma's mentally retarded are still being institution-
alized.22 Oklahoma ranks fiftieth in the nation in providing care for the
retarded outside of institutions.2 3 Despite the plan developed in 1983 by
the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for moving the retarded
from institutions to group homes and nursing homes with specialized
programs, 4 only sixty group homes have been established. z An esti-
15. Nide, supra note 3, at 232.
16. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat.
486 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6083 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 6009(2) (Supp. III 1985). "[I]t is in the national interest to strengthen specific
programs... that reduce or eliminate the need for institutional care, to meet the needs of persons
with developmental disabilities." Id. § 6000(a)(5).
18. M. Bates, State Zoning Legislation: A Purview 2 (Dec. 1985) (Wisconsin Council on Devel-
opmental Disabilities, Madison, Wis.) (unpublished manuscript).
19. Zoning for Community Homes Serving Developmentally Disabled Persons, 2 MENTAL DisA-
BILrrY L. REP. 794, 797 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zoning for Community Homes].
20. Id. at 795.
21. See Comment, supra note 5, at 515.
22. In 1984, 1,600 mentally retarded individuals were housed in Oklahoma's three institutions.
Special Report: Wasting Away in Oklahoma, The Tulsa Tribune (reprint of series published Oct. 1-
10, 1984), at 8, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Tribune Special Report].
23. Id. at 2, ol. 1. Lack of community programs in Oklahoma prevent many retarded individ-
uals from being released from institutions. Id at 2, col. 3.
24. Id. at 2, col. 2. In addition to the Department of Human Services [DHS] plan, Governor
George Nigh commissioned The Task Force on Mental Retardation on October 5, 1984, to consider
problems of the retarded and of existing programs, to identify gaps, and offer solutions by November
1986. Exec. Proclamation, signed Oct. 5, 1984 (on file with Oklahoma Secretary of State). Addition-
ally, First Lady Donna Nigh has lobbied the Oklahoma legislature for money to start group homes.
Tribune Special Report, supra note 21, at 20.
25. Telephone interview with Deborah S. Karns, executive director of Homelife Association for
the Handicapped, Inc. (Aug. 8, 1986). Homelife presented the Amicus Curiae Appellants' Supple-
mental Brief in Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985).
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mated 500 are needed.26
B. Zoning Barriers
Public opposition is the most significant factor leading to the
shortage of group homes. Concerns that property values, safety, traffic,
and noise levels will be adversely affected are offered as justification for
opponents' hostility27 despite evidence that the concerns lack validity.2"
The major deterrent to community-based group homes is local gov-
ernmental zoning. 29 Residential zoning ordinances generally specify the
type of permissible structure and the specific permissible use. 0 The two
types of zoning ordinances which have hindered group home develop-
ment most often are the "single-family dwelling" ordinance and the less
common "exclusionary" ordinance.3' The "single-family dwelling" ordi-
nance usually restricts family composition by one of three types of ordi-
nances. 32 The most restrictive ordinances limit "family" to categories of
related persons. 33 Less restrictive ordinances limit the number of unre-
lated persons who may live together - usually five or less.34 The least
restrictive ordinances consider a single housekeeping unit within the defi-
nition of single-family dwelling.35
26. Tribune Special Report, supra note 22, at 4, col. 1. Oklahoma's statistics contrast sharply
with Nebraska's where 2,000 retarded citizens benefit from community care programs and only 460
people are housed in its single institution. Id. at 18, col. 1.
27. Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restrictions on
Community Homes for Retarded Persons, 31 STANFORD L. REv. 767, 769 (1979) (citing D. LAUDER
& F. BANGS, ZONING FOR FAMILY AND GROUP CARE FACILITIES 8-10 (Am. Society of Planning
Officials Planning Advisory Serv. Rep. No. 300, 1974)).
28. See Zoningfor Community Homes, supra note 19, at 796 n.10 (empirical studies show no
basis for the apprehension regarding diminished property values); The Effects of Group Homes on
Property Values, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 309 (1985); see also J.T. Hobby &
Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274 S.E.2d 174, 178 n.7 (1981)
(study showing property values had increased in neighborhoods where group homes for the mentally
retarded had been located).
Safety fears are likewise unfounded because aggressive residents are not placed in group homes
absent supervision. See Zoning for Community Residences, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 316, 320
(1977).
29. Zoning for Community Homes, supra note 19, at 795 (zoning ordinances regulate land use
by dividing cities into commercial, industrial, and residential areas).
30. Disabled Citizens in the Community: Zoning Obstacles and Legal Remedies, 3 AMICUs,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 30.
31. Id. at 30-31 (an exclusionary ordinance specifically excludes individuals with certain identi-
fiable characteristics); see also Comment, A Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group
Homes For the Mentally Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV., 669, 670 (1980).
32. See Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded into Single-Family Residential Areas: A Grape
of Wrath or the Fermentation of Wisdom, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 385, 390.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, -. , 84 A.2d 687, 690 (1951)
[Vol. 22:201
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In some municipalities, zoning confines community group homes to
certain areas by designating them according to "use."136 "Use" designa-
tions include: (1) a "conditionally permitted use" in specific residential
areas, (2) a business or boarding house use in a commercial zone, or (3) a
use only in an area of hospitals and nursing homes.3" These types of
restrictions impede normalization by excluding the retarded from homo-
geneous neighborhood settings, and may create community group home
"ghettos. ,38
In the absence of legislation supporting group homes, exclusionary
methods are generally challenged on a case by case basis.39 Whether the
challenge fails or succeeds depends on the jurisdiction and the facts of
each case.40
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The dispute in Jackson arose when the Williams, parents of a
twenty-one year old mildly mentally retarded daughter, attempted to
lease their home in Tulsa, Oklahoma, to the non-profit Oil Capital Asso-
ciation for the Handicapped, Inc., "Association. ' 41 The house was to be
used as a residence for the daughter and four other "mildly retarded"
adult women;42 it was placed in a revocable inter vivos trust with Mr.
Williams as trustee.43 The trust would receive $1,000 per month rent
from the Association. In turn, the Association would receive rent from
the handicapped women to defer household expenses and a house-
keeper's salary.' The housekeeper would reside in the home, supervise
the household, and maintain a life-style similar to other subdivision
(single housekeeping unit definition of family met where four families used a 14-room house and
shared cooking and eating facilities); "A definition of'family,' in an ordinance, may be in terms of a
housekeeping unit, and.., it is not necessary that the persons ... be related by blood." 101A C. J.
S. Zoning & Land Planning § 119 (1979). Individual restrictive deed covenants may also exlude
community group homes much the same as zoning ordinances. Comment, Can the Mentally Re-
tarded Enjoy "Yards That Are Wide?", 28 WAYNE L. Rlv. 1349, 1360 (1982).
36. See Commentary, Zoning and Community Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded- Boon
or Bust?, 7 OHIo N.U.L. Rv. 64, 69 (1980).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 69-70.
39. See id. at 83.
40. Id.
41. See Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d at 1017, 1019 (Okla. 1985). The home is in the Park
Plaza South III Subdivision. Id.
42. Id. Testimony indicated the women's mental capacity ranged from the age of eight to
twelve. Id. at n.l.
43. Id. at 1019.
44. Id.
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residents.45
Homeowners in the Williams' subdivision, claiming a violation of
the single-family zoning ordinance, secured a temporary injunction that
prevented the women from occupying the home.46 They also claimed
violations of Covenant A, which specified residential lots and single-
family dwelling structures, and Covenant E, which prohibited noxious or
offensive uses.47 Additionally, at the permanent injunction hearing,
homeowners testified that the group home would create traffic conges-
tion, decrease property values in the neighborhood, and be a nuisance
because of the daughter's occasionally annoying conduct.48  The trial
court found the proposed group home incompatible with the zoning ordi-
nances and restrictive covenants and issued a permanent injunction.49
IV. THE JACKSON DECISION
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the opera-
tion of the proposed group home was not prohibited by the zoning ordi-
nance or the restrictive covenants. 50 In reaching this conclusion, the
court considered three questions: (1) whether the group home consti-
tuted a "single-family dwelling" within the Tulsa zoning ordinance, (2)
whether it violated the deed restriction limiting use and purpose, and (3)
whether it violated the noxious or offensive trade restriction. 5'
By strictly construing the ordinance's own definition of "family,"
45. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 2, Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Appellant's Brief].
46. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1019.
47. Id. at 1020. Relevant portions of the restrictive covenants at issue are:
Covenant A
"All lots in the tract shall be known and described as residential lot ... No structure shall
be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any building plot other than one
detached single-family dwelling." [Emphasis added].
Covenant E
"No noxious or offensive trade or activity shall be carried on upon any lot nor shall any-
thing be done thereon which may be or become an annoyance or nuisance to the
neighborhood."
Id. at 1021.
48. See id. at 1019.
49. Id. The trial judge based his conclusion on factors that included: (1) payment of rent for
room and board by five unrelated individuals, (2) transient-type residents could live in the home for
six months to an indefinite time, (3) the presence of Williams' daughter in the home would not
guarantee her permanency or that of other residents, (4) the home would be operated by the board of
a non-profit organization and not by the head of a household, (5) the presence of hired help on the
premises, (6) the girls would need guidance beyond that needed by normal persons of the same age,
and (7) outside financial assistance would be required for necessities. Id. at n.6.
50. Id. at 1024-25.
51. Id. at 1018-19.
[Vol. 22:201
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 22 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol22/iss2/4
1986] GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 207
the Jackson court held that the proposed group home was a "single-fam-
fly" dwelling for zoning purposes.12 In finding no violation of restrictive
Covenant A, the court utilized the same "family" definition found in the
zoning ordinance, due to the absence of relevant Oklahoma case law.
5 3
It also noted a marked difference between the "use" of the property for
residential purposes and the "character of the structure" as a single-
family dwelling. 4 The court declined to construe the two components of
Covenant A together in order to find a violation of the ordinance.5
Competing public policies were also considered as the court bal-
anced homeowners' rights against constitutional rights of the group
home members. The court found no violation of Covenant E prohibiting
noxious trade or activity because homeowners' claims were not substanti-
ated, and occupancy of the home by five mentally retarded persons did
not amount to "an annoyance or nuisance per se.
' 56
With both covenants, the court followed Oklahoma procedure in
strictly construing "all ambiguities... in favor of the unencumbered use
of the property." 57 It also indicated a willingness to void the restrictions
for violating the mentally retarded women's fundamental rights.58
V. ANALYSIS
A. Zoning and the Single-Family Dwelling
Although the constitutionality of zoning ordinances has been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court,59 a zoning restriction cannot be
imposed unless it bears a "substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare." 0 Wording of an exclusionary zoning
ordinance may be critical, because ordinances run the gamut from very
vague to very specific. 61 Thus, the wording often determines how the
52. Id. at 1020-21; see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
53. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021-23.
54. Id. at 1021.
55. Id. at 1024.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1021.
58. See id. at 1023 n.24.
59. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). More specific authority
for neighborhood zoning was granted in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) enabling municipal-
ities to create a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted," by
laying out "zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean
air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id. at 9.
60. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
61. See Comment, supra note 4, at 754-56 (the outcome of many community group home cases
7
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court will rule on a particular set of facts.
The zoning ordinance in Jackson sought to exclude by its definition
of "family"; however, the definition was susceptible to a broad interpre-
tation.62 In examining the zoning ordinance in Jackson, the court fol-
lowed its prior rule of strictly construing zoning ordinances. It refused
to extend the ordinance by implication, and it resolved ambiguities in
favor of the property owner whose use was in dispute.63
The zoning code referred to in Jackson states that when a term is
defined, definition controls interpretation."4 The subdivision at issue
was zoned a RS-3 Residential Single-Family High Density District.
65
Terminology in the code is explained in the definitions section,66 where
"single-family dwelling" prohibits occupancy by more than one family.
"Family" is defined as: "One or more persons occupying a single dwell-
ing unit, provided that unless all members are related by blood, marriage,
or adoption, no such family shall contain over five persons, but further
provided that domestic servants may be housed on the premises without
being designated as a family.",67
The court referred to case law in Oklahoma and other states where
definition controlled. In Dolese Bros. Co. v. Privett,68 statutory intent was
ascertained by definition and found "applicable to the same word or
phrase whenever it occurs, except where a contrary intention plainly ap-
pears., 69 Definition was also key in Oliver v. Zoning Commission of
Chester,70 where a controversy developed over a proposed group home
for eight or nine mentally retarded adults supervised by a married couple
acting as houseparents. 71 Local zoning regulations defined family as:
"One or more persons occupying the premises as a single housekeeping
unit, as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging
house, club, fraternity or hotel."72 The Oliver court concluded that the
is based on the definitional aspect of single "family" homes); 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONING § 18.01 (1986).
62. See Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021.
63. See Cauvel v. City of Tulsa, 368 P.2d 660, 661 (Okla. 1962).
64. TULSA, OKLA., CHARTER AND REV. ORDINANCES tit. 42, § 110.2(c) (Supp. 1986).
65. Id. § 200. Residential single-family districts are "designed to permit the development and
conservation of single-family detached dwelling in suitable environments in a variety of densities to
meet the varying requirements of families." Id. § 400.2.
66. Id. § 1800.
67. Id.
68. 622 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 1981).
69. Id. at 1083-84.
70. 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (Conn. C.P. 1974).
71. Id.
72. Id. at -, 326 A.2d at 845.
[Vol. 22:201
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use of the dwelling as "a single housekeeping unit" controlled the defini-
tion, but did not control the mutual relationship of the occupants.73
The definition of family contained in an ordinance was also control-
ling in Carroll v. City of Miami Beach.74 The Carroll court rejected the
city's attempt to construe the word "family" according to the meaning
usually ascribed by the general public. Instead, the Carroll court held
that the city was bound by the express terms of its own ordinance in
defining family.75
In Jackson, the supreme court determined that the group home was
within the single-family definition in the zoning code. The court stated
that the group would live in a one family dwelling unit. Furthermore,
five women would not exceed the quota of unrelated persons, and the
housekeeper was allowed as an additional person. The court found no
requirement or even implication that the home need be jointly owned by
the residents, as the appellees argued.76
The arguments in the Jackson controversy apply generally to both
municipal zoning and covenant restrictions. Because the objectives of
both types of restrictions are analogous, 77 the remainder of the discussion
will treat them collectively.
B. The Restrictive Covenants
The law generally does not favor restrictive covenants. The Jackson
court adheres to the rule construing covenants strictly and resolving am-
biguities in favor of the unrestricted use of property.78 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court took a similar view in J. T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v.
73. See id. at -, 326 A.2d at 841 (the court allowed the group home as a permitted single-
family use).
74. 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. (1967); see also Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311
N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa 1981) (ordinance did not limit the number of allowable persons nor require a
biological or legal relationship).
75. Carroll, 198 So. 2d at 645.
76. See Brief for Appellees at 7, Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017 (Okla. 1985); Jackson, 714
P.2d at 1021.
77. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1360.
78. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021; see also Pirtle v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1979). A ham radio operator sought to erect a radio antenna on his home lot and neighbors
sought to enjoin its erection. The court noted the basic principle in our society is for the unencum-
bered use of real property and cautioned, "[too great a willingness by a court to imply restrictions
on the use of real property may diminish property rights beyond that intended by the grantor." Id.
at 1100; see also Public Service Co. v. Home Builders Ass'n of Realtors, Inc., 554 P.2d 1181, 1185
(Okla. 1976) (PSO sought to restrain Home Builders from placing a driveway and parking lot over
PSO's right of way; the court did not find that the improvements were within the structural restric-
tion, thereby upholding the unencumbered use of the property).
9
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Family Homes of Wake County, Inc.79 Hobby states: "The rule of strict
construction is grounded in sound considerations of public policy: It is in
the best interests of society that the free and unrestricted use and enjoy-
ment of land be encouraged to its fullest extent."' 0
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Jackson, finds a "use" restriction
(residential) and a structural restriction (single-family dwelling) in Cove-
nant A of the deed of dedication of the neighborhood.81 The court's dif-
ferentiation between the two restrictions was crucial to the decision. 2
1. Residential Use Restriction
The initial sentence in Covenant A 3 requires that the lots be resi-
dential, and the Jackson court interprets this as restricting the use of the
home. 4 This use restriction requires that the lots be used for residential
purposes, while the rest of Covenant A requires that the structure be a
single-family dwelling.8"
If the use of a home is to be considered residential, the atmosphere
must be that of a family.86 Other factors determining residential use are
the purpose of the home and its non-institutional quality.8 7 A treatment
facility or a commercial venture would not be considered residential uses.
The Jackson court's recognition of the group home's use as residen-
tial was strengthened by the fact that no educational training, nursing, or
medical care would be provided by the housekeeper or anyone else in the
home.88 The five women in Jackson were to function as a housekeeping
unit and share in household duties while pursuing employment outside
the home.89 The housekeeper was to function as head of the household,
supervising and guiding the group. The group's daily activities appeared
79. 302 N.C. 64, -, 274 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981); accord Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653,
-, 345 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1984) (restrictive covenants, if ambiguous, should be construed to allow maxi-
mum unrestricted property use).
80. J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274
S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981).
81. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021. Covenant E is analyzed at pp. 218-19 infra.
82. See supra note 47 for pertinent text of Covenant A.
83. Id.
84. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021.
85. Id. at 1021-22.
86. J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274
S.E.2d 174, 180-81 (1981); Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. 1981),
87. Hobby at -, 274 S.E.2d at 180.
88. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022; see also Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421,-.., 288 N.W.2d 815,
821 (1980) (eight mentally retarded residents lived voluntarily in the house and no professional care
or therapy was available. The home's purpose was to provide a residential living environment to
integrate retarded citizens into the community.).
89. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022.
[Vol. 22:201
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similar to that of other families in the neighborhood.90
The court distinguished Jackson from Garcia v. Siffrin Residential
Association,91 where the primary purpose of the proposed residential
treatment facility for mentally retarded persons was not to provide the
family atmosphere of a group home, but was to provide training and
educational opportunities. The facility proposed in Garcia was to be cor-
porately owned, and operated by a director who would bring in a mar-
ried couple to reside on the premises, two full time female workers, and
other staff needed to provide the "habilitation services" and "personal
care" required by Ohio statute under the "family home" definition.92
Applicants for residency were to sign month-to-month contracts and
were to be charged according to their physical or educational needs.93
Residential use has also been denied when a group home was
equated with a boarding house providing food and lodging for independ-
ent boarders. 94 The Jackson court distinguished the group home from a
boarding house because the five women would live as an integrated unit
comparable to a family. Although the housekeeper was paid to supervise
and the women paid rent to the association, the court declined to con-
strue the use as commercial because financial gain was not the motivation
for operation of the home. 95 The Jackson court is supported by the
Hobby court's reasoning that an economic exchange for the rent and a
housekeeper's salary was an insubstantial consideration that failed to al-
ter the character of the residential situation.96
The Jackson court found that the purpose of the group home was to
allow the occupants to function as a family unit, and that the method of
operation was noninstitutional.97 Therefore, the Jackson court distin-
guished the group home from a commercial venture, and brought it
90. Id.
91. 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
92. Id. at -, 407 N.E.2d at 1372-73.
93. Id. at l, 407 N.E.2d at 1373.
94. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022; see also Hobby, 302 N.C. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 180 (surrogate
parents and retarded adults living under their supervision were seen as an integrated unit, as opposed
to independent persons merely sharing the place they eat and sleep as "boarders in a boarding
house").
95. Jackson, 417 P.2d at 1022.
96. Hobby, 302 N.C. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 180; accord Costley v. Caromin House, Inc., 313
N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1981) ("Although Caromin House receives compensation for its services, the
home does not thereby become commercial in nature .... The profit nature alone would not alter
the objective of providing noninstitutional living for mentally retarded persons; the home still serves
a residential purpose.").
97. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022.
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within the parameters of residential usage.98
2. Structural Restriction
The court interpreted the remainder of the covenant as requiring
that any structure in the neighborhood be a single-family dwelling lim-
ited in size and style.99 Family and type of dwelling were therefore ex-
amined as components of structural use.
a. Definition of 'family" in 'single-family dwelling"
The interpretation of "family" may be expressly defined in a restric-
tive covenant or zoning ordinance,w0 or may be provided by case law or
state legislation. "Family" may include a stable housekeeping unit or a
group resembling a family by its permanent nature. 0 1 In the absence of
Oklahoma precedent, of an express definition in the covenant, 0 2 and of
relevant state legislation, 0 3 the Jackson court adopted a liberal interpre-
tation of "family" similar to the zoning definition."°
The Jackson court distinguished the traditional consanguineous defi-
nition of family from the less restrictive definition.' 0 5 Less restrictive
family definitions given by the court are: (a) a "nuclear family" which
98. For other cases supporting the proposition that a group home is a residential purpose see
Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1981); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653,
345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis.
2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980).
99. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021-22.
100. Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 28, at 317.
101. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449, 452 (1974).
102. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022-23. Where "family" was not defined in a deed restriction, group
of adults unrelated by blood or marriage did not violate restrictive covenant. Crowley v. Knapp, 94
Wis. 2d 421, -, 288 N.W.2d 815, 823-24 (1980).
103. Jackson notes Concord Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Special Children's Found., Inc.,
459 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1984). The Concord Estates court allowed the group home for men-
tally retarded under Louisiana's Mental Retardation and Development Disability Law. The law
allowed community homes providing for six mentally retarded individuals, and no more than two
live-in staff to be "considered single-family units having common interests, goals, and problems."
Id. at 1245.
104. The dissenting justice in Jackson claims the term "single-family dwelling" in the covenants
should be interpreted by ordinary meaning and not according to the zoning ordinance. Jackson, 714
P.2d at 1025. But see Craig v. Bossenberry, 134 Mich. App. 543, -, 351 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1984)
(where there is an absence of a definition of "family" in a covenant, there is an "ambiguity open to
judicial interpretation"); City of Livonia v. Department of Social Servs., 423 Mich. 466, -, 378
N.W.2d 402, 430 (1985) ("Family" was not defined in the covenant and the court construed the term
to include more than just a nuclear or extended family); cf Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sallette
v. Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954) (court finds violation of zoning ordinance
only when express limitations are disregarded). "[T"he ordinary concept of that term [family] does
not necessarily imply only a group bound by ties of relationship." Id. at -, 66 N.W.2d at 630.
105. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.23.
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includes parents, children, and domestic servants, and (b) an "extended
family" which "consists of a nucleus group of persons related by blood,
marriage or adoption which may include parents, children and other
kinsmen.., such as grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nieces and the like and
even lodgers and boarders.""0 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, finds even an "extended
family" definition too restrictive for a single-family dwelling structural
restriction.107 The Jackson court quotes the concurring justice's defini-
tion of family in Shaver v. Hunterm 8 as "a stable housekeeping unit of
two or more persons who are emotionally attached to each other and
share a relationship that emulates traditional family values, promotes
mutual protection, support, happiness, physical well-being and intellec-
tual growth."10 9
The Jackson group home arrangement would more closely resemble
the extended family in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, °10 where a
mother, her son, and two grandsons lived together,"1 than a group of
college students living together temporarily.' 2 The ordinance" 3 in
Moore restricting certain relatives from living together was struck down
as violating the "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life,"'14 recognized by the Supreme Court as a liberty protected by
106. Id. The Texas Supreme Court in 1959 added boarders to the nuclear family definition, and
adopted an "extended family" view. Southampton Civic Club v. Couch, 159 Tex. 464, -, 322
S.W.2d 516, 518 (1958) (renting of a room must be "incidental to its use as a family residence").
However, the Texas Appellate Court in Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 578 (rex. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982), was unwilling to extend the definition to include four
unrelated single adults, including three severely handicapped persons and a health care provider.
107. See Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.23(3) (the extended family definition was "unrealistic and
unduly restrictive") (quoting Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (Countiss,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982)). The extended family definition is not "the only
societal arrangement entitled to be recognized as a family." Shaver, 626 S.W.2d at 579.
108. 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
109. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.23 (quoting Shaver, 626 S.W.2d at 579). Jackson also relies on
Knudtson v.Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, -, 345 N.W.2d 4, 7 (1984):
To suggest that "families" composed of residents of group homes are to be distinguished
from natural families in determining which single-family districts will be considered open
to them is to confuse the power to control physical use of premises with the power to
distinguish among occupants making the same physical use of them.
(quoting Y.W.C.A. v. Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 384, 341 A.2d 356 (1975), aff'd, 141
N.J. Super. 315, 358 A.2d 211 (1976)).
110. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
111. Ial at 496-97.
112. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (transient college students not permitted
to share a house in a "single-family" neighborhood).
113. 431 U.S. at 496. In Moore, the ordinance defined family so that certain relatives could not
live together. Id. at n.2.
114. Id. at 499.
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the fourteenth amendment.11 5 Moore authorizes granting single-family
residence status to a group home meeting an extended family definition.
Jackson therefore rejects the reasoning of other jurisdictions which have
defined family narrowly." 6
Using a more liberal definition of "family," the Jackson court found
the group home to be a permanent arrangement intended to create a nor-
mal family atmosphere akin to a traditional family." 7 Indeed, a group
home is often the sole family for many mentally retarded individuals who
have no natural families and little likelihood of ever marrying and form-
ing independent families." z8 To residents, a group home becomes a sub-
stitute family, allowing them to lead "more normal and meaningful lives
within the community" than would be possible in an institution." 9
Therefore, a narrow definition of family would cause an injustice. 120
For these reasons, the court recognizes that "single-family dwelling"
structural provisions do not limit the use of the property to a single-
family residence; 12 such provisions may include a group home as a sin-
gle family unit.
b. Physical structure of the residence
The Jackson court found that the structural requirement in Cove-
nant A generally controls the type of building that may be constructed,
and does not refer to the type of persons who might occupy it. 122
Although the character of the structure allowed on a lot may be re-
stricted by covenant to a single-family residence, the premises are not
necessarily restricted to use by a single consanguineous family.1 23 Con-
115. Id.
116. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.23. The court contrasted London v. Handicapped Facilities
Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (term "family" used in the deed and restrictions
found intended to refer to blood, marriage, or adoptive relationships, thereby excluding residential
group homes); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12,-.., 319 S.E.2d 728, 732 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1192 (1985) (the Virginia Supreme Court favored a broad interpretation of "family" but stated
that the presence of counselors who are publicly employed in a group home would change a single-
family use into a facility use); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (four unrelated single adults found excluded from the extended family
definition of parents, children, servants, lodgers and boarders).
117. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022. Justice Wilson, dissenting, favored limiting "single-family
dwelling" to its more narrow definition. Id. at 1025.
118. Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, -, 290 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1980).
119. Id. at -, 290 N.W.2d at 103.
120. Id.
121. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023. However, more than one family unit per dwelling would be
prohibited. Id.
122. See id. at 1022-23. See supra note 47 for covenant text.
123. See id. at 1023. A restriction on the character of the structure which may be located on the
[Vol. 22:201
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versely, when the restrictive covenant limits the use of property to a sin-
gle-family residence instead of only prescribing the structural form or
character, courts may enjoin the group home arrangement1 24 and any
other arrangement not a single-family residence, often by using the nu-
clear or extended family definition.125
Based on this distinction between a single-family building restriction
and the use of property for a single-family residence, the Jackson court
factually distinguished Shaver.'26 In Jackson, the covenant restricted the
house to a single-family building; 27 in Shaver, the covenant restricted
use of the house to a residential purpose. 128 The Shaver covenant pro-
vided that "all lots shall be used for residential purposes only" and "a
residence shall be construed to be a single family dwelling."' 12 9 The
Shaver court used the wording of the covenant combined with a narrow
interpretation of the word "family" to exclude the three handicapped
women and their health-care provider from the neighborhood. 3 '
The Jackson court also rejected Omega Corp. v. Malloy.13  In
Omega, the court held that an arrangement of four unrelated mentally
retarded adults and their counselor violated a restrictive covenant nearly
identical to the covenant in Jackson. 132 The Jackson court interpreted
the two part covenant in Jackson as a use (residential) and a structural
requirement (single-family). 133 The Virginia Supreme Court in Omega,
however, construed the Omega covenant in its entirety, and placed a use
requirement on the second sentence which made the covenant read:
"only dwellings designed structurally for single-family occupancy may be
erected and.., the buildings may be used only for single-family residen-
lot does not restrict the premises to a particular use. J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of
Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1981).
124. See Jayno Heights Landowners Ass'n v. Preston, 85 Mich. App. 443, 271 N.W.2d 268
(1978); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192
(1985).
125. Jayno Heights, 85 Mich. App. at -, 271 N.W.2d at 270. The dissenting justice favored
using the basis of affiliation of the six elderly adult women to include them within the restrictive
covenant definition of "one single family unit," rather than the extended family definition which the
majority used to exclude the group. Id. at -, 271 N.W.2d at 272.
126. Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1016
(1982), noted in Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.23(3).
127. See supra note 46.
128. Shaver, 626 S.W.2d at 576.
129. Id.
130. Id at 578.
131. 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985).
132. See id. at 729. The pertinent portion of the covenant reads: "No lot shall be used except for
residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot
other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." Id.
133. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021-22.
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tial purposes." '134 The Omega court ruled that "single-family nature of a
use is destroyed when the element of supervision by counselors is added
to the occupancy of unrelated persons." '135 Consequently, the restrictive
covenant was violated.13 6
The Oklahoma court refused to deviate from its strict construction
rule and interpreted each sentence of Covenant A independently, and
thereby kept the single-family residential "use" restriction separate from
the "structural" restriction.' 37 The court concurred with jurisdictions
that refused to enjoin group living arrangements where the covenant re-
stricts the form or character of the structure as a single family residence,
rather than limiting property use to a single-family residence.13
A structural restriction has been satisfied when, despite any altera-
tions, the appearance of a house remains similar to a typical American
suburban family home." 9 Accordingly, the Jackson court found the in-
tegrity of the structure was not violated by the addition of a full bath-
room, three closets, an additional rear door, and a fire ladder at the rear
of the house."4 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Knudtson
v. Trainor'4 found no problem meeting the structural requirement when
a wood deck was added to serve as a fire escape for a house where five
mentally retarded women and their houseparents lived.142
134. Omega, 228 Va. at -, 319 S.E.2d at 731. In 1947, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
"dwelling" when used alone refers to both use and structure. Schwarzschild v. Welborne, 186 Va.
1052, 45 S.E.2d 152 (1947). The dissent in Omega calls the majority's reliance on Schwarzschild
misplaced as an attempt to utilize a portion of it while "distinguishing the great bulk of opinion
which runs counter to the majority's rationale." Omega, 228 Va. at - 319 S.E.2d at 734 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
135. Omega, 228 Va. at -, 319 S.E.2d at 731. A further distinguishing factor was the court's
rejection of the appellant's definition of "family" as "the collective body of persons who live in one
house." Id. at , 319 S.E.2d at 731-32.
136. Id. at -' 319 S.E.2d at 732.
137. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022-23 (1985). The court in J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc.
v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc. 302 N.C. 64, -, 274 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1981), concurs that
each part of a covenant which contains a restriction must be interpreted in such a manner that each
portion of the covenant is given the effect that was fair and reasonably intended.
138. See Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022 (citing Hobby, 302 N.C. at -, 274 S.E.2d at 180-81; Knudt-
son v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, -, 345 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1984) ("a limitation on a lot is not also a
limitation on its use") (construing Sissel v. Smith, 242 Ga. 595, 250 S.E.2d 463 (1978) (beauty shop
operation allowed in a single-family dwelling in a residential neighborhood))); see also Bellarmine
Hills Ass'n v. Residential Systems Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978) (group of six
mentally retarded children and their foster parent living in single-family home was held to be a
"family" per the covenant restricting structures to single-family residences).
139. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, -, 288 N.W.2d 815, 821 (1980).
140. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022.
141. 216 Neb. 653, -, 345 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1984).
142. Id; see also Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, -, 288 N.W.2d 815, 821 (1980) (court
allowed an attached garage to be converted into two bedrooms when the exterior structure was
unchanged).
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The structural requirement was met in Jackson because the home
was designed for a single family, the character of the structure was un-
changed, and the court qualified the group living together as an inte-
grated unit within its definition of family. 43 The court ultimately found
the group home was not in violation of Covenant A. The composition of
the group brought it within the single-family zoning definition. The use
of the home as a stable housekeeping unit with no extraneous care or
treatment functions made it a residential usage under Covenant A. The
broad definition the court afforded "family" and the unchanged appear-
ance of the house brought it within the parameters of Covenant A.
C. Balancing Competing Interests
Although the Jackson court's analysis focused on the literal inter-
pretation of the zoning ordinance and restrictive covenant, there was an
obvious underlying concern for individual rights in balancing the com-
peting public policies embodied in the dispute. On one hand, property
owners were concerned about their contractual rights'4 which are af-
forded protection under the law by enforcement of restrictive covenants
the owner relied upon when investing in land and a home.1 4 1 Provided
that restrictive covenants do not offend substantive law or public policy
considerations, they are legitimate aids to developers and owners to con-
trol use of property and regulate activities on land. 146
On the other hand, the mentally retarded not only have the right to
live as normally as possible, but are also entitled to develop to their ut-
most potential. 147 They also have the right to establish a home in a resi-
dential neighborhood.' 48
143. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024.
144. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides: "No state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... The Constitution prohibits states from impairing private contracts.
Therefore, a restrictive covenant, as a contract, should be upheld if it is clear, unambiguous, and
constitutional. See Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574, 577-79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1016 (1982).
145. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d at 421, -, 288 N.W.2d 815, 828 (1980) (Coffey, J., dissent-
ing). "[C]ovenant restricting land to residential use... constitutes a valuable property right ......
Id. at -, 288 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting Hall v. Church of the Open Bible, 4 Wis. 2d 246, 248, 89
N.W.2d 798, 799 (1958).
146. See J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274
S.E.2d 174, 179 (1981).
147. See Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, supra note 16,
§§ 6009(1)(2), which gives the retarded the right to receive habilitation in a setting that is "least
resrictive of [their] personal liberty."
148. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3266 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1. Public Policy
Restrictive covenants are valuable property rights encompassing not
only monetary value but also the aesthetic characteristics of a family en-
vironment. 49 Failure to enforce them may work an injustice to the
property owners. 150 However, establishing group homes for the mentally
retarded is supported by several public policy arguments. In general,
public policy supports the free and unrestricted use of property. This
requires strict construction of deed restrictions to promote "unencum-
bered and free use of property." 151 The Jackson court acknowledges that
although intentions of the parties to restrictive covenants usually control
their construction, such covenants are, nevertheless, not favored by
law. 152
Accordingly, "the right to contract is subject to the restriction that
any agreement 'which contravenes public policy' is void." 15 3 Oklahoma
case law also declares contracts "which... undermine security of indi-
vidual rights, whether of personal liability or private property" to be
against public policy. 154 More specifically, public policy supporting the
mentally handicapped is embodied in federal law 5 and state law156
which encourage maintenance and development of programs to assist the
mentally handicapped.15 7 Although Oklahoma has neither passed any
enabling legislation for group homes nor articulated any public policy
supporting rights of the mentally retarded to live in group homes, a DHS
plan calls for moving the retarded to homes in the community. 15 Addi-
149. Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 137, 290 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1980).
150. Id. (construing Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich. 283, 8 N.W.2d 67 (1943)). This was the posi-
tion taken by the dissenting Justice in Jackson. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1025.
151. See Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, -, 288 N.W.2d 815, 822 (1980).
152. See Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1021.
153. Amicus Curiae Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 11, Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017
(Okla. 1985) (quoting 12 Am. JuR. Contracts, § 167 (1938); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 211 (1963)).
Since the "Gold Clause" case in 1935, it has been established that contracts against the express
public policy of the United States established by congressional act are void as against public policy.
Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 Geo. L.J. 514, 523 (1949) (citing Norman v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (gold clauses in private contracts calling for payment in gold coin
could be set aside as interfering with Congressional authority to regulate currency)).
154. Anderson v. Reed, 133 Okla. 23, 26, 270 P. 854, 856 (1928).
155. See supra note 16; see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). (Act promotes coordination of rehabilitative and independent living programs).
156. See supra note 16. Oklahoma established the Office of Handicapped Concerns to identify
and meet the needs of the handicapped and to implement the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, §§ 9.21-.24 (Supp. 1985).
157. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255-58 (1985) (the state's
interest in providing for the mentally retarded is plainly legitimate; national and state legislative
responses demonstrate that lawmakers have been addressing their unique problems).
158. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:201
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tionally, there is a growing statewide group home network supporting
community placement and facilities for the mentally retarded.159
The Oklahoma court, in Jackson, gave credence to the policy sup-
porting the reform efforts by referring to case law in states with enabling
legislation.1 60 Jackson cited the Hobby decision favoring group homes,
which was based not only on state rules and procedures, but also on the
established common law principles it found "appropriate to apply to a
contemporary concept of care for the handicapped." 16 '
Furthermore, public policy against state enforcement of discrimina-
tory agreements was established in Shelley v. Kraemer162 by the Supreme
Court which denied enforcement of a racially discriminatory restrictive
covenant.163 Extending this reasoning, covenants restricting property
use to single-family residential usage could be declared against public
policy if they discriminate by excluding the mentally retarded.
In considering whether neighboring homeowners' property rights
would be violated by the presence of the group home, the Jackson court
determined whether Covenant E, which prohibits "noxious or offensive
activities creating a nuisance or annoyance," had been violated.' 64
Again, the court narrowly construed the Covenant as prohibiting com-
mercial activity, and declared that the same reasoning used under Cove-
nant A to determine a residential usage would allow the group home.165
The court found no support for the charge of possible increased neigh-
borhood traffic, or that any increased service personnel would create a
nuisance in the subdivision. 166 The court found that the group home
would not constitute a nuisance or annoyance, despite appellee's testi-
mony," nor would the resident's behavior be different from that of a
159. Telephone interview with Don Anderson, Okla. State Repr. (Sept. 20, 1986). See supra
notes 24-25 (organizations supporting mentally retarded, such as Homelife Assoc. for the Handi-
capped, Inc., are gaining strength).
160. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022 n.22. Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Caro-
lina, and Wisconsin all have enabling legislation for mentally retarded group homes. See M. Bates,
supra note 17.
161. J.T. Hobby & Son, Inc. v. Family Homes of Wake County, Inc., 302 N.C. 64, -, 274
S.E.2d 174, 182 (1981), cited in Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1022 n.22; see also Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v.
Residential Systems Co., 64 Mich. App. 554, -, 269 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1978) ("[t]he associational
nexus of the group clearly occupies a favored position in our state's public policy").
162. 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
163. Id. at 20.
164. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024; see supra note 47 for Covenant E text.
165. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024; see supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (residential use
was determined because there would be no training, nursing, or education provided in the home, and
the group would live as a stable housekeeping unit within a family atmosphere).
166. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024.
167. Id. at 1019; see also Pirtle v. Wade, 593 P.2d 1098 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) where there was a
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child.16 Had the court addressed the competing public policy interests,
it would arguably have found that the policy favoring the group home
supported the narrow construction of the Covenant.169
2. Constitutionality of the Ordinance
The Jackson court acknowledged that enforcement of a discrimina-
tory ordinance may be declared an unconstitutional violation of four-
teenth amendment equal protection rights.17 0 A restrictive covenant was
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of Shelley v.
Kraemer,171 where a neighborhood covenant prevented selling homes to
blacks. The Court recognized that discriminatory acts of private individ-
uals, such as race restrictive agreements, could be converted into state
action by judicial enforcement of a private contract.1 72 Therefore, ra-
cially restrictive agreements and covenants were held unenforceable by
state and federal courts.
Shelley applies to rulings where judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants have caused denial of property rights, on the grounds of race
or color, which are available to other community members for full enjoy-
ment of their equal rights.1 73 The issue is not as clear, however, when the
restrictive covenant is non-discriminatory on its face,174 as in Jackson,
where a covenant restricted neighborhood residency to single-family
dwelling use. Nevertheless, by its enforcement, a facially non-discrimi-
natory covenant could exclude a minority, such as a group of mentally
retarded individuals seeking to establish a group home. 17- Enforcement
similar covenant against noxious or offensive trade. The court did not find that the existence of the
radio antenna violated the restriction even though the neighbors expected it to be unsightly and to
have a negative effect on surrounding property values. The court again emphasized its intent to
resolve all doubts in favor of the unencumbered use of property. Id. at 1099-1100.
168. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1024.
169. See Craig v. Bossenberry, 134 Mich. App. 543, 351 N.W.2d 596 (1984). After analyzing
the competing public policy factors supporting property owners' rights to enforce restrictive cove-
nants versus the public policy factors supporting community placement of the retarded, the court
said: "Thus, we hold that the restrictive covenant which... bars the placement of a small group
home for ... mentally retarded adults is unenforceable as violative of our public policy." Id. at 601;
accord McMillen v. Iserman, 120 Mich. App. 785, 795, 327 N.W.2d 559, 563 (1982) (court con-
cluded that the deed restriction "specifically prohibiting... facilities for the mentally handicapped,
is manifestly against the public interest and thus unenforceable on public policy grounds").
170. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.24.
171. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
172. Id. at 1424; see Crooks, supra note 153, at 522.
173. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
174. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (municipal ordinance regulated public laun-
dries by requiring consent of board supervisors without consideration for competency of applicant
or propriety of location).
175. The result follows the rationale of Yick Wo, where the effect of enforcing the San Francisco
[Vol. 22:201
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of discriminatory restrictions which exclude group homes forces the
mentally retarded into confinement in institutions and violates their right
to liberty.176 Therefore, if challenged, the covenant could be declared
unconstitutional and consequently unenforceable.
The Jackson court notes that the Supreme Court has not presently
expanded Shelley beyond restrictive covenants with racial qualifica-
tions. 177 The Jackson court indicated that had it excluded the group
home from the neighborhood by narrowly interpreting the restrictive
covenant, Shelley may have been invoked to bar enforcement of the
covenant. 
178
In addition to Shelley, the Jackson court noted the fourteenth
amendment challenge of a zoning ordinance 179 in the recent Supreme
Court decision, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 180 In
Cleburne, a city ordinance expressly required "hospitals for the feeble-
minded" to apply for a special use permit in an area designated R-3,
high-density, multi-use. 8' A permit was subsequently denied for a
ordinance, rather than the wording, was held violative of the equal protection clause guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment.
176. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) recognizes a constitutional right not to
be confined simply because of mental disability.
Isolating the retarded into institutions subjects them to separate treatment. The adequacy and
availability of incommunity resources "is central to the inquiry into whether separate treatment for
the mentally retarded person is not inherently unequal just as racially segregated education was
found inherently unequal in Brown v. Board of Education," 347 U.S. 483 (1954), construed in Hald-
erman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1321 (E.D. P.A. 1977) (subsequent
history omitted). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221 (D.C. Pa.
1985) for review of the 10 year litigation brought on behalf of institutionalized retarded persons
regarding alleged violation of constitutional and statutory rights to adequate habilitation in least
restrictive environments. The final settlement provided for community living arrangements for those
residents for whom such placement is deemed appropriate. The settlement confirmed that the re-
tarded have a right to community care and training. Id. at 1233.
177. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1024 n.24.
178. Id. As indicated in Jackson, Shelley has been applied by some state courts in contexts other
than racial discrimination. Id. Compare Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d.
1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). The court found the condomin-
ium article prohibiting children under age 12 from living on condominium premises an unconstitu-
tional violation of apartment purchaser's rights to marry and have children. Condominium
association allowing certain families with children under 12 living on premises and allowing children
as guests made enforcement of the restriction a violation of equal protection, because it was arbitrary
and unreasonably selective. Id. at 1087-88; see also West Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 24 Ohio
Misc. 66, 261 N.E.2d 196 (1969) (enforcement of covenants which would prohibit erection of houses
of worship by property owner and religious organization deemed state action violative of First
Amendment, comparable provisions of Ohio Constitution, and public policy). But see Riley v.
Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (enforcement of zoning ordinance which restricted
occupancy of lots in mobile home park to persons over 21 years of age did not deprive defendants of
their constitutional rights).
179. Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1023 n.24.
180. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
181. Id. at 3252 n.3.
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group home for thirteen mildly to moderately retarded adults. 82
Proponents of the Texas group home claimed the combination of
historical prejudice, political powerlessness, and immutable characteris-
tics called for heightened scrutiny of any legislation that discriminated
against the mentally retarded residents. 183 The Supreme Court, however,
used a rational basis standard of review,184 indicating that if quasi-sus-
pect status was given to the mentally retarded it would be difficult to
distinguish other groups who may possess similar characteristics, such as
"the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm." '85
The Court held the ordinance invalid as applied to the group home
and found the city's refusal to grant a "special use permit" not even ra-
tionally related to any legitimate purpose.18 6 Requiring the permit was
based on "irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded"' 7 and
"depriv[ed] them of the equal protection of the laws." 188
The Jackson court avoided deciding whether the restrictions, which
included the requirement of securing a variance for a group home, had
even a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose. By qualifying the
group home within its single-family definition, the court stated applica-
tion for a variance was unnecessary. 189
Because the retarded have a substantial interest in establishing
group homes enabling them to become intregrated into community
life, 190 Justice Marshall, 191 in dissent, espoused a heightened standard of
182. Id. at 3252-53.
183. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae for the Association for Retarded Citizens/USA at 2, City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). The Court has held that only classifi-
cations infringing upon certain fundamental constitutional rights or classifications that disadvantage
"discrete and insular minorities" will be subjected to strict scrutiny. United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (dictum).
Under a strict scrutiny standard, the city would be required to show the zoning regulation was
necessary to promote a compelling government interest. Under the rational basis standard it is only
necessary for the zoning ordinance to be rationally related to the city's legitimate interest. See J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 590-99 (2d ed. 1983).
184. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252 (1985). The Court found the states interest in dealing with and
providing for the mentally retarded legitimate, and that the national and state legislative response to
the retarded negated any claim that the retarded are politically powerless and in need of a higher
standard of review. Id. at 3356-57. The rational basis standard gives government the latitude to
pursue policies to assist the retarded although the activities incidentally burden them. Id. at 3258.
185. Id. at 3257-58.
186. Id. at 3259.
187. Id at 3260.
188. Id. at 3258-59.
189. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Okla. 1985). To obtain a variance or special use
permit, an operator must prove the home meets certain requirements. This usually requires a public
hearing. See Comment, supra note 5, at 516.
190. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266. "Classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully
[Vol. 22:201
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review when a zoning ordinance excludes the retarded from all residen-
tial areas. 192 Justice Marshall stated that the "right to establish a home"
was a fundamental liberty deserving due process protection from ordi-
nances denying the retarded this right. 93 He decried the court's "nar-
row, as-applied remedy" '194 that fails to provide a "principled
foundation" for determining when a higher level of inquiry would be in-
voked, thereby leaving courts without clear precedent.'95
Although the Jackson court noted the constitutional issues and po-
tential application to zoning and covenant restrictions that discriminate
"by application" against the mentally retarded, the court's decision was
based on a strict interpretation of the restriction. 196 Many courts, includ-
ing the Jackson court, attempt to avoid the constitutional issues and con-
centrate on "drafting their orders narrowly according to the facts of each
case."197 This is largely the result of the lack of clear precedent on the
issues and on the degree of scrutiny that will be invoked. 198 A broad-
stroke decision by the Supreme Court in Cleburne would have offered
greater acknowledgement of mentally retarded persons' rights to equal
protection, and afforded lower courts more definitive guidance in making
constitutionally based decisions invalidating discriminatory ordinances.
VI. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The Jackson decision will hasten the establishment of the 500 group
homes needed in Oklahoma.' 9 9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has now
examined to assure they do not rest on impermissable assumptions of false stereotypes regarding
individual ability or need." Id. at 3275.
191. Justice Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He was joined by Justice Brennan
and Justice Blackburn.
192. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265. The class of mentally retarded persons needing group homes
fits precisely within criteria established by the Supreme Court for demonstrating the need for consti-
tutional protection. "The mentally retarded are a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to... political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Amicus Brief, supra note
153, at 23-24 (construing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
193. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977) ("When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements.... the
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced.").
194. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3275.
195. Id. at 3265.
196. See supra notes 59-142 and accompanying text.
197. See Commentary, supra note 36, at 71. "[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
198. See Commentary, supra note 36, at 71.
199. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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established that "family" will be liberally defined; this will allow group
homes to be located where zoning laws and restrictive covenants similar
to those in Jackson exist.2 °°
Progress has already occurred since Jackson. Tulsa has added a spe-
cific definition that permits group homes for the mentally retarded in
single-family neighborhoods. °1 Proponents of group homes no longer
have to appear before the zoning board of adjustment requesting an "ex-
ception" to allow a home each time one is proposed.2 "2 Zoning has also
been liberalized in Oklahoma City allowing up to eight mentally retarded
individuals to live in a group home in a single-family neighborhood. 0 3
Reducing zoning restrictions aimed at group homes in itself serves to
accelerate acceptance of group homes by neighborhood residents. Ex-
posing neighborhood residents to well-run facilities educates them and
reduces prejudice and hostility.2" As a result, future opposition to
group homes or related enabling legislation is reduced.205
To date, however, the progress of deinstitutionalization has been
agonizingly slow. This is evidenced by a recent federal judge's ruling in
Homeward Bound, Inc., v. Hissom Memorial Center.2 °6 In Hissom, a
DHS official indicated it might take the state five to ten years to develop
a viable community group home program;207 therefore, the judge ordered
200. Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022-23 (Okla. 1985).
201. See Definitions, supra note 64 (Neighborhood Group Home added to section). A neighbor-
hood group home is now defined as a home for independent living with support personnel that
provides for room and board, personal care, and habilitation services in a family environment as a
single-housekeeping unit for not more than five resident mentally retarded and/or physically limited
persons with at least one but not more than two resident staff persons. Personal care and habilitation
services excludes on-site institutional type educational training, medical, or nursing care. For other
changes, see TULSA, OKLA., CHARTER AND REV. ORDINANCES, tit. 42, ch. 12, § 1206 (1981)
(amended May, 1986). A Neighborhood Group Home section is added to single-family dwelling and
also to multi-family dwelling uses. Id at § 1208.2.
202. Under § 1206.3, Use Conditions, a group home must be licensed by the state, obtain a
Zoning Clearance Permit, display no signs, make no exterior alterations, and avoid clustering by
allowing one-quarter mile between group homes. This facilitates keeping a normal neighborhood
and benefits neighbors and the retarded.
203. OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 59, §§ 2304.15, 3200.3B(2)(c) (1980)
(amended 1985).
204. Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 28, at 321.
205. Id.
206. No. 85-C-437-E (E.D. Okla. filed May 2, 1985). Institution for mentally retarded children
charged by parents with abuse, neglect, unnecessary restraints, and denial of adequate care and
habilitative services. Plaintiffs seek declaration and enforcement of constitutional and statutory
rights of retarded persons to meaningful and integrated community services. Id. at 3. However, the
parents of 100 Hissom residents are in opposition, fearing that a successful lawsuit will close the
institution, thereby denying parents a choice of where to place their children. Peterson, Heartbreak
Over Hissom, Tulsa Tribune, Nov. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
207. Tulsa World, July 30, 1986, at IA, col. 3.
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both parties to submit a comprehensive plan2" 8 within two months "re-
garding the implementation of establishing community group homes." 209
If the Hissom case were to culminate in a federal judge's mandate to
deinstitutionalize most or all of the 500 mentally retarded residents, ma-
jor questions would arise. Eighty to one hundred group homes could be
needed in a relatively short time. Will group homes for the severely and
profoundly retarded be afforded protection, or only group homes for the
mildly retarded, as in Jackson? Accommodating the profoundly retarded
would require more services, increased personnel and traffic in the neigh-
borhood, and possible structural changes to the house and grounds.
Would this combination of factors cause their exclusion on the basis that
the group home was institutional in nature rather than residential? Even
though the individuals could not be excluded as a family, a group home
could be excluded because of its institutional character.210 Moreover, be-
cause the Jackson decision was based on a narrow interpretation of the
specific zoning law and restrictive covenants, the question arises whether
group homes may be successfully challenged by neighborhoods with dif-
ferent types of zoning and covenants. Would the combination of a fed-
eral mandate and the Jackson decision ensure the successful integration
of retarded individuals into neighborhoods, or would new cases be al-
lowed to be raised in the courts?
Had the decision in Jackson been based on public policy and the
constitutional issues of discrimination against a suspect group resulting
in deprivation of the rights of the mentally retarded to community inte-
gration,211 the questions may have been answered with greater certainty.
This would have reduced future litigation, and aided deinstitutionaliza-
tion of all three state institutions.
However, a constitutional decision also may have increased the pos-
sibility that the same reasoning used in deciding mentally retarded group
home cases would be applied in other types of group home cases, such as
half-way houses, where restrictive zoning has been an exclusionary fac-
208. Homeward Bound v. Hissom Memorial Center (E.D. Okla. Aug. 1, 1986) (order granting
class action determination).
209. Id. at 2. In response to the judicial order, the DHS Commission for Human Services con-
sented on September 23 to begin a five-year plan to move 500 of the state's institutionalized mentally
retarded into community group homes. Tulsa Tribune, Sept. 25, 1986, at 1D, col. 1. Attorneys for
Homeward Bound announced their deinstitutionalization plan at an October 15 news conference.
The plan requires a minimum 450 positions to be made available in group homes within three years.
Tulsa Tribune, Oct. 15, 1986, at ID, cols. 2-3. Most of the Hissom residents are included in the plan
which would locate half the residents in Tulsa county homes. Id. at 3.
210. See Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1985).
211. See supra notes 144-98 and accompanying text.
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tor.212 The degree of success of such efforts would necessarily be a mat-
ter for judicial determination.
To further reduce zoning barriers, enabling legislation is needed in
Oklahoma. Legislation is the most effective way to insure placement of
group homes in the community because it is not subject to the veto of
local subdivisions.213 To eliminate opposition, statutes must be explicitly
tailored to meet the needs of all concerned state and local governments,
and the mentally retarded individuals.21 4 For example, a statute may
expressly mandate that community residences for the developmentally
disabled are a permitted use in all residential districts. 15 Skillfully
drafted legislation eliminates the litigation that occurs when group
homes are proposed in new areas with unchallenged zoning.
Legislation proposed in Oklahoma in 1984 is gaining strength, gar-
nering thirty-seven of the fifty-one votes necessary for passage when
again introduced in March, 1986, in the House of Representatives.21 6
The proposed legislation has been limited to address zoning that singu-
larly benefits the mentally retarded to minimize prejudice and fears that
passage of this bill would also allow other types of group homes.217
Group homes for other unrelated persons, such as half-way houses for
ex-convicts, the mentally ill, drug rehabilitation, or communal living sit-
212. The dissenting Justice in Jackson expressed concern that the decision could lead to "selec-
tive enforcement of restrictive covenants... against all non-single family residence uses except for
mentally handicapped persons." Jackson, 714 P.2d at 1025 (Wilson, J., dissenting). A half-way
house would likely be included under § 1205 of the Tulsa Zoning Code which includes transitional
living centers. Property uses listed under § 1205 are permitted in residential zoning districts only by
special exception from the Board of Adjustment and could be excluded by protesting neighborhood
residents. See TULSA, OKLA., CHARTER AND REv. ORDINANCES, tit. 42, ch. 12, § 1205 (1986).
213. R. ANDERSON, I AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.02 (3d ed. 1986). However, in at least
one case, a state statute allowing group homes was successfully challenged by a municipality having
a restrictive zoning ordinance. Garcia v. Siffran Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d
1369 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 711 (1981).
214. See Model Statute: An Act to Establish the Right to Locate Community Homes for Develop-
mentally Disabled Persons in the Residential Neighborhoods of This State, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 806 (1978), for a general explanation of model legislation enabling group home placement.
215. See M. Bates, supra note 18, at 16 (describing a New Jersey statute enacted in 1978). Legis-
lation was effective September 1, 1985, in Texas that allows a "family home" in all residential zones
or districts in the state. Family home includes up to six disabled persons, regardless of their legal
relationship, and two supervising personnel. The home must provide food, shelter, guidance, habili-
tation services, and meet licensing requirements. Disabled person includes many physical ailments,
mental retardation, and emotional illnesses. See id. at 21.
216. H.R. 1124, 40th Okla. Leg., 1st Sess., (1985). The bill specifies a group home for the devel-
opmentally disabled admitting up to eight persons. "[Section] 4... A group home is a residential
use of property.., and shall be treated as a permitted use in all residential zones .... ." Id. at 3; 46
Okla. Legis. Rep. 41 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1986) (vote call report).
217. Legislators' and constituents' fears are embodied in the old Oklahoma political saying,
"Once a camel gets his nose in the tent you're looking at the whole camel." Telephone interview
with the author of H.R. 1124, Don Anderson, Okla. State Rep. (Sept. 20, 1986).
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uations have often elicited strong opposition. 218 Therefore, states that
have given priority to normalization of life for the mentally retarded have
passed legislation expressly excluding half-way houses2 19 so that commu-
nity placement of the retarded would not be jeopardized by general oppo-
sition to group homes.
Passage of the enabling legislation to be re-introduced in early 1987
is enhanced due to the awareness generated by the Jackson decision. The
statement by Oklahoma's highest court favoring the mentally retarded
group home should influence legislators to vote for the proposed bill.220
Publicity has also brought the plight of the retarded to the attention of
constituents who may increase pressure on legislators to support the
bill.221
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Jackson decision does not provide easy answers to all
the questions arising about group homes, it is nevertheless significant.
218. Many such groups have been found to violate covenants when defendant groups were
clearly identified. See Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974) (members of communal group
found violating single-family ordinance); Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Found., 153
Conn. 305, 216 A.2d 442 (1966) (large house used by Foundation (drug rehabilitation program) for
11-34 persons violated zoning regulation of "one family" per lot). Contra, State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99,
405 A.2d 368 (1979) (communal living of several religiously affiliated families in one dwelling unit
allowed when ordinance found to violate consitutional rights of privacy and due process).
219. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.286a(3) (Supp. 1981-1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-
101(b) (1980) cited in Comment, supra note 35, at 1387 n.278. Even the ABA Model Legislation
Statute demonstrates the option to single out and explicitly define the developmentally disabled. See
Model Statute, supra note 214.
220. The report of the Governor's Task Force, which is expected to favor group homes, would
serve as an additional positive influence on legislators. See supra note 24.
221. See Pruitt, On Their Own, Tulsa World, Sept. 21, 1986, (OK Magazine), at 11. Publicity
concerning Homeward Bound, Inc., v. Hissom Memorial Center, highlights the disproportionately
higher cost of institutionalization. See Tulsa Tribune, Oct. 15, 1986, at 4D, col. 5. The cost of
institutionalizing a mentally retarded child in Oklahoma is $85 per day, compared with an estimated
$36 in a private facility. In 1985, Oklahoma spent $45 million to care for 1,600 mentally retarded in
institutions, compared to Nebraska which spent $17.4 million for institutional care of 460 persons
and $33 million for group homes, sheltered workshops and other programs for 2,000 mentally re-
tarded citizens. Tribune Special Report, supra note 22, at 17, col. 3.
Hampering legislative efforts is the potential turnover of one-third of the representatives in this
election year, some of whom supported the bill. Another deterrent is the national impetus toward
states assuming more funding of programs for the handicapped, and the uncertainty of Oklahoma's
economy, which could increase the chance that legislation affecting the handicapped will be dropped
until public policy articulates the demand for change. Telephone interview with Don Anderson,
Okla. State Rep. (Sept. 20, 1986).
The state's economic condition, however, could spur group home development in Oklahoma.
The Homeward Bound plan to move Hissom residents into group homes estimates savings of $30
million within three years because of cheaper costs of providing community care, savings from oper-
ating the institution, and additional federal funding. Tulsa Tribune, Oct. 15, 1986, at 4D, col. 5.
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The decision has increased publicity, and therefore awareness, of the
plight of the mentally retarded. It demonstrates to property owners that
the retarded have received favorable attention by Oklahoma's highest
court and gives the retarded a strong legal defense. Due to the court's
comment on the constitutional issues, it may also be seen as a warning
that a future decision would be made on a constitional basis. In addi-
tion, the decision spurred the major cities in Oklahoma to focus on their
zoning codes and make changes beneficial to the retarded.
Jackson, therefore, represents a major building block in the attempt
to build a more normal, integrated life for the retarded in Oklahoma.
The decision also helps provide the mentally impaired a way out of insti-
tutions. More importantly, it may prevent them from ever experiencing
the de-normalizing effect of an institution.
Admittedly, not all of the mentally retarded or their parents may
choose group homes as a way of living; but those who do now have
greater access to that option. In the past, the only options in Oklahoma
were care in one's home, with the attendant difficulties and future uncer-
tainties, or institutionalization. Now, the possibility for a normal life in a
group home, and the achievement of one's greatest potential, could be-
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